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Gasser: The 1977 Geneva Protocols

A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE 1977 GENEVA PROTOCOLS
by
DR. HANS-PETER GASSER*
INTRODUCTION

In analyzing the two 1977 Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions for the protection of war victims one should never forget that they are
on
not the product of a sudden inspiration. The first cornerstone for Protocol 1,
Rules
for
The
Draft
early
Fifties.
international armed conflicts, was laid in the
the Limitation of the Dangers incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of
War, drawn up by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and
submitted to the Nineteenth International Red Cross Conference (New Delhi,
1957), were an unsuccessful attempt to improve the protection of the civilian
population against the effect of hostilities: the predecessor of Part IV of Protocol I. The legal staff of the ICRC built largely on this text - and on the experience of its rejection - while drafting the new text which eventually
became Protocol I.
It took the wars of the Sixties (Viet Nam, Nigeria, Bangladesh, the Middle
East) and decolonization to induce States to take a real interest in the reaffirmation and development of international humanitarian law. The famous UN
Resolution 2444 (XXIII) is another cornerstone of the new edifice.
Unanimously adopted in 1968 by the United Nations General Assembly, the
resolution affirms three fundamental principles which must be respected "by
all governmental and other authorities responsible for action in armed conflicts," among them the absolute prohibition of attacks on the civilian population as such. At the same time, Resolution 2444 (XXIII) invites the SecretaryGeneral "in consultation with the International Committee of the Red Cross"
to study "the need for additional humanitarian international conventions." As
we know, the ICRC took up the issue once more, consulted innumerable experts, drafted two Protocols and finally asked the Swiss Government to convene the Diplomatic Conference which negotiated the Protocols, from 1974 to
1977, in Geneva.
The first session of the Diplomatic Conference was characterized by a
clash between some countries from the Western world and others from the
Third World. The issue was whether wars of national liberation should be
qualified as international armed conflicts (and no longer as civil wars, which
makes them an internal affair of the country concerned). We will come back to
this issue later, but it should be recalled at this juncture that the Diplomatic
Conference in Geneva was the first occasion for newly independent countries
to participate in drafting rules of international humanitarian law. So it is not
surprising that their delegates emphasized a point which was particularly imPublished by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1986
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portant for them.
The emotional clashes on the subject of wars of national liberation subsided and gave way to calm negotiations, to a search for an acceptable balance
between humanitarian considerations and military necessity. Most observers
are of the opinion that the Conference succeeded in finding the right answers.
Before turning our attention to some contentious issues, let us have a look
at the major contributionsof both Protocols:
1. Protocol I increases the protection of the civilian population against
the effects of hostilities, by codifying and supplementing the rules of
customary law known as the "law of The Hague." The reaffirmation and
simultaneous incorporation into treaty law of the prohibition of attacks
against civilians is an event of historic significance.
2. Protocol I adds weight to the rules of customary law regulating
methods and means of warfare. Indeed, in these final years of the twentieth
century, governments have again committed themselves to the longestablished principle that the right to choose the means of warfare is not
unlimited. The text then goes on to adapt the provisions governing combatant
status to present-day realities.
3. Protocol I fills certain lacunae in the "law of Geneva."
4. Protocol II brings a welcome advance in the protection of victims of
non-internationalarmed conflicts by developing the existing law (the provisions of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions).
The American press has reported on the Joint Chiefs of Staffs' recommendation not to ratify Protocol I. Inasmuch as military considerations are meant
to justify the rejection, the author of these lines, a lawyer, a foreigner and an
official of a humanitarian organization, is hardly qualified to make a rebuttal.
Nevertheless, the following comment seems permissible: Protocol I was
negotiated over many years, with the participation of military experts in many
delegations, and was finally adopted by consensus, no doubt after consultation
of the military authorities back home: so the rules cannot be too far away from
what is compatible with military considerations. It should be possible to find a
solution for the remaining controversial issues in declarations of understanding or, if necessary, in reservations. Non-ratification of Protocol I by a major
power, however, would make it impossible to find a common framework of
rules accepted by all sides, a framework which would have to be respected by
all parties to future conflicts.
Others have voiced the criticism that Protocol I blurs the distinction between combatants and civilians, and that it introduces subjective criteria in the
categorization of armed conflicts. These objections cover two distinct issues,
which have to be treated separately.
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ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMBATANTS AND CIVILIANS IN PROTOCOL 1:

Articles 43 and 44 give a new definition of the criteria which, in an international armed conflict, have to be met if a person wants to qualify as a combatant and a prisoner of war. By taking into account the realities of guerrilla
warfare, the new rules introduce a novel solution for the most difficult problem of striking the balance between the different interests involved. The
resulting Article 44 is a compromise worked out at the Diplomatic Conference
with the decisive participation of the United States delegation. It safeguards
the immunity of the civilian population and brings guerrilla forces into the ambit of international humanitarian law, its rights and - particularly important
- its obligations.

It is important to bear in mind that, while the law may be new, the problems raised by the presence of irregular forces on the battlefield are very old indeed. As long ago as 1874, at the Brussels Conference, governments tried to
hammer out a compromise. It is interesting to note that, even at that time,
representatives of small nations - the likely victims of enemy occupation pleaded for the recognition of guerrilleros as lawful combatants, without success (the provision relating to a "levee en masse" being the concession made by
the Conference). Article 43 and 44 of Protocol I are therefore the outcome of a
long historical process.
A careful reading of Article 44, in particular paragraph 3, reveals that it
does not permit war in civilian disguise. It is clearly stated that combatants
have an obligation under the law to distinguish themselves from the civilian
population (paragraph 3, first sentence). Feigning of civilian, non-combatant
status by compatants is an act of perfidy (Article 37, paragraph 1(c)) and liable
to sanctions as a violation of the law of war. Only under exceptional circumstances is the requirement of distinction weakened. Article 44, paragraph
3, second sentence, states: "Recognizing, however, that there are situations in
armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself

. .

." But even in these exceptional cir-

cumstances a combatant still has an obligation to distinguish himself from the
civilian population and to carry arms openly "during each military engagement" and "during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which
he is to participate."
The keys for understanding this rule are the interpretation given to "exceptional circumstances" and to the word "deployment." At the Diplomatic
Conference, the general opinion was that only two situations might qualify
under Article 44, paragraph 3, i.e., military occupation, and wars of national
liberation. With respect to the interpretation of "deployment," the U.S. delegation made a declaration at the signature of Protocol I which reads as follows:
"It is the understanding of the United States of America that the phrase
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"military deployment preceding the launching of an attack" in Article 44,
paragraph 3, means any movement towards a place from which an attack is to
be launched." This understanding should safeguard its forces against surprise
by the use of civilian disguise.
Under Protocol I, failure to meet the minimum standards became for the
first time a breach of international humanitarian law liable to be penalized at
national level.
The Diplomatic Conference had to find a compromise on the issue if it
wanted to bring the three-year effort to modernize the law of international
armed conflict to a successful conclusion. The new rule brings those guerrilla
fighters who meet the new strict criteria into the orbit of international law.
Those who qualify as lawful combatants are now under the obligation to respect the whole body of international humanitarian law. They may not attack
civilians, take hostages, or spread terror among the civilian population. To do
so would be a violation of international law and, under qualified circumstances, would constitute a grave breach, a war crime. The alternative would
have been the exclusion of guerrilla fighters from the rights and obligations of
the law of war - and the failure of the 1974-1977 Diplomatic Conference.
Those "fighters" who do not meet the strict criteria of Protocol I do not
acquire combatant status and remain liable to penal prosecution under national law. They have to be guaranteed a fair trial. Otherwise, their status has
not been affected by the law of 1977.
WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

Article 1, paragraph 4, of Protocol I qualifies certain struggles for selfdetermination under very limited conditions as international armed conflicts.
The idea is of course not new. Since the adoption of the Charter of the United
Nations and, in particular, since 1960, the United Nations Organization has
been consistently developing the concept of a right to self-determination.
The Diplomatic Conference chose to bring international humanitarian
law into line with this evolution. It did not break new ground. Moreover, the
Conference took a very narrow approach to the concept of self-determination,
consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
(24 October 1970, 2625 (XXV)).
It may be recalled that only peoples have a right to self-determination.
Any entity not qualifying as a people, such as a minority, or, afortiori,a group
of political opponents, does not have that right. Indeed, the above mentioned
Declaration (to which Article 1, paragraph 4 of Protocol I refers) states clearly
that there is no justification for any action which would break up an existing
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sovereign state.
It has been said that under the Protocol regional organizations will decide
which entity is a people and which is not. There is nothing in Protocol I which
points in that direction. It is always the government of the State against which
a group is opposed which ultimately decides on the character of the conflict.
New Article 1, paragraph 4, of Protocol I has to be viewed in this narrow
sense and understood accordingly. In no way has Protocol I abolished the
distinction made by international humanitarian law between international and
non-international armed conflicts.
The legal effect of Article 1, paragraph 4, is that the two sides involved in
such a conflict will be obliged to respect the whole body of humanitarian law
applicable in international armed conflicts, including, of course, its farreaching rules on protection of the civilian population. Both sides are subject
to the same obligations. Protocol I does not call the doctrine of the "just war"
back from oblivion.
In the opinion of most delegations at the 1974-1977 Diplomatic Conference, only a very small number of situations could actually be covered by
this rule. It is well known that the States whose names have been advanced in
this context will not ratify Protocol I. The problems raised by Article 1,
paragraph 4, are therefore mainly academic in character.
These few remarks conclude with a reminder to the audience that the
1977 Protocols are also a product of their time. They are the mirror of the
hopes and the controversies of recent decades. The overwhelming majority of
the new rules are universally considered as a positive achievement, an important step forward, in particular in protecting civilians against the horrors of
war. The presence of a small number of controversial rules which do not
belong with the overall gist of the texts should not mask the fact that the Protocols provide far greater protection for the victims of war. They should
therefore be very widely accepted and ratified.
* Legal

Advisor to the Directorate, International Committee of the Red Cross,

Geneva, Switzerland.
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